Introduction
Besides foreign aid, trade and debt, remittances of former migrants have become a source of increasing amounts of foreign exchange for their country of origin. Most countries' remittances have remained below 10 % of GDP. For some countries as Jordan and Yemen they are structurally as high as 20 %. The highest values of more than 60 % are observed in years of serious trouble like Lebanon in the end of the 1980s, and more than 20 % in Albania, Cape Verde in the beginning of the 1990s, Bosnia in the end of the 1990s, and Haiti in the beginning of this millennium. One of the interesting related questions is how this affects growth. There are some macroeconomic papers on this question so far.
1 Glytsos (2005) estimates the impact of remittances on consumption, investment, output and imports for five countries in a traditional, dynamic Keynesian model 2 . He finds long term * I am grateful to Femke Kramer for drawing my attention to the issue, to Pierre Mohnen for a very helpful discussion and two anonymous referees for useful comments. 1 For literature based on micro studies, see Rapoport and Docquier (2006) and Adams (2006) . The results of the more recent household panels are very similar to those obtained here. However, a macroeconomic approach can work towards an analysis of the effects on levels and growth rates of the GDP per capita. 2 There is no price mechanism, no technology or resource constraint. Lagged dependent variables make the model dynamic.
multipliers of (on average) 2.3 for income (and .6 for investment). The paper is rich in discussing the related ups and downs of remittances and other variables, but it does not consider the impact of remittances on human capital. Chami et al. (2003) have argued that remittances provide an incentive to reduce effort and thereby make weak economic performances more likely. They find negative impacts of remittances on growth. Catrinescu et al. (2009) extend their approach to include policy and institutional variables and run the estimation for a dynamic panel. They find some significantly positive results for the impact of remittances on growth, but these are not very robust. In these growth regressions, remittances and investment appear as right-hand side variable, which might cause collinearity and therefore a wrong sign. Chami et al. (2003) do not discuss this possibility. Catrinescu et al. point out that there are endogeneity problems. Therefore we think it is the best not to have remittances in the equations for growth or investment but rather in that of savings, which depend on disposable income of which transfers like remittances and aid are a crucial part. Solimano (2003) has included remittances in a time-series growth regression for Colombia and Ecuador finding a positive sign for both countries, which is insignificant though for Ecuador. The regression does not include a labour growth variable. Mundaca (2005 Mundaca ( , 2009 ) adds remittances to a growth regression for some countries. It contains the standard deviation of GDP per capita growth and domestic bank credit as regressors. She finds a positive effect of remittances on growth, which is higher than without the credit variable. She interprets this as a higher impact of remittances in the presence of better financial development, because remittances are better channelled to their purposes. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2008) add remittances multiplied to financial variables and find positive growth effects for financially less developed countries. This is the opposite of Mundaca's interpretation based on the idea that better financial development makes credit available and therefore remittances would have less of an impact on investment and growth but rather replaces credit by own capital. However, the two papers have in common that the coefficients of remittances and financial indicators are positive. These latter four papers use growth regressions, which tell us whether or not there is an effect on growth but not why and how it works (see Durlauf et al. 2005) . Essentially, from an economic point of view they are single equation models. They allow for the application of sophisticated econometric methods but do not make explicit the economic mechanisms which drive the growth. Besides demand, moral hazard and financial development as treated in these papers, the channels from remittances to physical and human capital accumulation are certainly important and so are the economic mechanisms along which these work. But these papers only contain the effect of the investments on growth but not from remittances on the investments in human and physical capital. In order to get insights into the economic mechanism leading from remittances to growth via savings, interest rates, investments in physical and human capital, and the size of the effects we set up a simultaneous equation model. We are not afraid that one mis-specified equation contaminates the others 3 , because we use well-established equations, and get very plausible results.
The model dealing with this consists of seven equations, six of which are available in the literature and slightly adjusted for our purpose. First, remittances as a share of GDP are explained by an equation similar to that of Chami et al. (2003) and others earlier 4 con-taining the differences of income and interest rates in the host country and the country of origin. Second, remittances are added to an equation explaining the savings ratio similar to that in Loayza et al. (2000) . Third, an increase in savings reduces the gap between investment and savings, which in turn reduces domestic interest rates as found by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) . Fourth, an interest rate reduction has a positive impact on the investment/GDP ratio in a standard investment function. Fifth, enrolments in primary schooling are a non-linear function of their own past values and changes of development aid and, for poorer countries, the savings ratio. Sixth, a higher savings ratio (except for poor countries) together with higher enrolments in primary education leads to higher literacy five years later. 5 By implication, the concept is that remittances have an impact on human capital via savings as in the theory of Cinar and Docquier (2004) 6 and Bertoli (2006), with savings entering the enrolment equation for poorer countries and the literacy equation for less poor countries.
7 Seventh, thus enhanced investment shares and literacy may enhance transitional growth rates and the level of per capita income in standard growth equations related to the model by Mankiw et al. (1992) and linked to open economy situations by Barro et al. (1995) assuming that borrowing is proportional to physical capital. When world income growth is included as suggested by models with imported inputs the initial value of GDP per capita is insignificant and there are effects on the permanent growth rate. We concentrate on this latter case. We use data from the World Development Indicators for a sample with 96 countries, which had at least one dollar of remittances in 2003, and three sub-samples. We estimate the seven equations simultaneously for pooled data allowing for contemporaneous correlation between them. In both cases we use the General Method of Moments allowing for weak exogeneity. In section 2 we set up a model that explains our line of thought on how remittances have an impact on growth. In section 3 the data and the econometric method are explained. Section 4 explains the results of the estimates. In section 5 we calculate the direct, shortrun (similar to impact) effects of remittances on the endogenous variables for the permanent growth model. Section 6 presents the long run solution for the permanent growth model. Section 7 analyses stability and transitional gains. Section 8 summarizes and concludes.
The model
The starting point of the model is the equation explaining worker remittances as a percentage of GDP. This is formulated in equation (1). The first index of each coefficient indicates the number of the equation and the second that of the regressor. We drop time and country indices throughout. 5 Equations for literacy have been estimated by Akhand and Gupta (2002) , Mazumdar (2005) and Verner (2005) . 6 See also the micro-evidence cited there. 7 Chami et al. (2008) mention the impact of remittances on education only verbally but do not include it in their model. They conclude from household panel studies that effects of remittances on investment are not productive. This conclusion is actually static and partial because it ignores multiplier effects on investments (Taylor 1999) and effects from savings on investment (general equilibrium effects). Moreover, their model has a fixed capital stock excluding consideration of effects of remittances on investment. For migration effects other than remittances on education and health in panels of households, see McKenzie (2006) . wr=gdp ¼ c 11 þ c 12 wrðÀ1Þ=gdpðÀ1Þ þ c 13 logðOECÞ þ c 14 ðlogðgdppcðÀ2ÞÞþ
Remittances, wr/gdp, are assumed to be driven by differences in the income per capita of the recipient and the sender. Therefore we include the income of the recipient country. The senders know their own current income. As most of the migrants go to the OECD countries we approximate their income by per capita income of the OECD, OEC.
8
The sender will have information on the recipient country only from data about earlier years because it takes about a year in many countries to make the data. An indicator of the recipients' income is therefore Gross Domestic Product per capita with two lags, gdppc(-2). The two income variables need not have the same coefficient because the OECD income is only a crude proxy that comes in because we use only one indicator for the host country of the senders. We do not use the Gross National Income as senders are more likely to receive information on GDP then those of GNI through the media. The sender might consider saving the amount of money rather than transferring it. Therefore we use the real interest rate of the USA, rius, as an indicator of these opportunity costs.
On the other hand the sender might consider putting the money into a bank account in the recipient country. Therefore we also include the real interest rate of the recipient country, ri, with the same information lag as for the GDP per capita variable. Finally, remittances are assumed to depend on their own past value, a constant and a time trend, which will be dropped if insignificant. As real interest rates can be highly negative we add a value of 1 to it, before taking natural logarithms, because we use interest rates in their scientific notation, that is, 5 % is indicated by '.05'. Essentially equation (1) above is the one that appears also in Chami et al. (2003) . 9 Using natural logs or not for the remittance variable does not matter for the results in this equation. Further below we will provide equations explaining the (growth of) GDP per capita and the dynamics of the interest rates. The US interest rate and the GDP per capita of the OECD will not be determined in the model. We add residuals, u, whose index is that of the equation. 
8 Niimi and Ö zden (2006) provide some evidence that migration to Gulf countries does not yield different results than to the OECD in explaining remittances flows. 9 Chami et al. (2003) use the real income of the USA instead of that of the OECD. 10 Using other regressors leads to different endogeneity problems than those discussed below. They are discussed by Niimi and Ö zden (2006) in connection with a cross-country regression. For example, the income per capita of sender and destination countries used in this paper would also explain the number of migrants, which are a major determinant in their regression. The authors do not discuss the paper by Chami et al. (2003) , which is closest to our approach. But they have interesting results in regard to the disaggregation with respect to education. Stock data on number of migrants are available only for 1990 and 2000 in Docquier and Marfouk (2006) . Therefore we can't use them for our dynamic analysis. Since the work on this paper Docquier has made data for the stock of migrants in six OECD countries by 195 countries of origin, which can be found on the World Bank website.
Basically, we assume that the savings ratio, savgdp, is driven by its own past value and, as in most of the literature (see Loayza et al. 2000 , Table 1 ), by the growth of GDP per capita and by real interest rates. As disposable income is conceptually probably a better variable (see Bertoli 2006, eq. (6) ) but also less available in terms of data we may add changes of worker remittances to the regression, which are part of disposable income but not part of GDP. The idea here is that higher disposable income and therefore remittances lead to a higher savings ratio as in models using the difference of consumption and a consumption minimum in the utility function when the country in question is close to that minimum. This is quite plausible here because remittances reduce poverty (see Adams/Page 2005) . As an equation with a lagged dependent variable is similar to one on changes in savings here we take changes of remittances as a variable. Moreover, we add changes of official development aid and their squared term to the regression because aid might be significant (see Doucouliagos/Paldam 2006) .
If remittances enhance savings they should diminish the difference of investment and savings, which is the additional demand or flow variable of foreign debt. This should reduce interest rates as captured by equation (3).
c 34 ðinvgdpðÀ1Þ À savgdpðÀ1ÞÞ þ c 35 ðinvgdpðÀ1Þ À savgdpðÀ1ÞÞ 2 þ c 36 dðlogðOECðÀ1ÞÞÞ þ c 37 ðlogð1 þ riusðÀ1ÞÞ À logð1 þ riusðÀ2ÞÞÞ þ u 3
There are several possible rationales for this equation. First, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) have derived such a relation between the current account and the interest rate (without the other variables included here) from a two period model with transport costs. Second, in Bardhan (1967) and later publications on growth under capital movements by others one finds the assumption that large countries may have an impact on the world market interest rate and therefore on there own interest rate through a lower or higher stock of net debt per unit of GDP. If so, this should also hold for the flow of net debt. It is questionable here whether the countries involved have monopoly power. But they may have this as a group if their behaviour goes into the same direction. Third, it is plausible to relate domestic interest rates to the sum of LIBOR/EURIBOR or Prime Rate and a country specific spread or risk premium. Edwards (1984) has shown that they depend on the ratio of debt to GDP or GNI. This ratio is lower one period after investment net of savings less than the growth of the GDP. Banks and rating agencies then can verify that less new debt relative to GDP is incurred and may reduce spreads. Therefore we use the lagged variable of the current account deficit or investment minus savings. Moreover, Belloc and Gandolfo (2005) argue that this relation may be non-linear based on data analysis. Therefore we include a squared term of the investment-savings difference. Moreover, two lagged dependent variables, the change in the US interest rate, and the growth rate of the OECD are included. The change in the US interest rate will be highly insignificant in all but one of the estimates. But the growth rate of the OECD, which is highly correlated with the US interest rate, is significant. The reason probably is that it enhances exports and therefore less new debt has to be incurred leading to lower spreads, or alternatively an impact on the exchange rate.
If remittances via enhanced savings and lower net debt demand reduce interest rates, the link to physical capital is gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP, gfcfgdp. This is captured as in equation (4). Besides the impact of remittances on physical investment via enhanced savings, reduced debt demand and interest rates, the higher savings from more remittances may complement primary school enrolments in their effect on literacy. This is captured in equation (5).
lit À litðÀ5Þ ¼ c 51 þ c 52 litðÀ5Þ þ c 53 sepriðÀ5Þ þ c 54 savgdpðÀ5Þþ
Literacy, lit, is assumed to depend on its own lagged value in a linear-quadratic way, on enrolment in primary schooling five years earlier, sepri, and the savings available at the moment of enrolment. These can be used to avoid credit constraints (see Cinar/Docquier 2004 , Bertoli 2006 . Public expenditures on education as a share of GDP are also included. Enrolments are significant in the cross-country regression of Verner (2005), and Mazumdar (2005) has suggested public expenditure on education as a share of GDP. It is insignificant in his cross-country regressions but significant in our pooled estimate, which suggests that there is a dynamic impact. Literacy data are used as a proxy for human capital. They have a pretty good variation over time and across countries. In the working paper version we show the kernel density estimate using the EpanechnikovSilverman approach (see Silverman 1986) . The distribution has decreasing maximum and increasing minimum values and goes from a slight twin peak structure to one that is increasingly skewed.
Enrolment in primary schooling, sepri, is assumed to be a quadratic function of its lagged value and its square, and again savings at the moment of enrolment and the change of development aid, which is sometimes tied to investment in education through conditions imposed by donors. 
We use five-year intervals here for two reasons. First, we do want to get rid of business cycle effects. Second, we do not want to apply the method of using five-year averages for reasons given in Loayza et al. (2000) and Attanasio et al. (2000) . In regard to the investment as a share of GDP variable Attanasio et al. (2000) have pointed out that growth regressions tend to use the investment data over the same period as the dependent variable whereas vector-autoregressive approaches use lagged investment and both get opposite signs. As the authors point out, this is hard to explain. We use both, current and lagged investments. Then, in a steady state both have equal values and can have the same role as the savings ratio in a Cass-Koopmans growth model if the difference of their coefficients is positive. They can differ, however, outside the steady state and will increase over time if the utility function has a consumption minimum to be reached for positive utility (see Dollar/Burnside 1997) 14 . Table 1 confirms this empirically for the past. Savings ratios for poorer countries had positive growth rates, whereas those of richer countries had negative growth rates. Investment rates are still growing in all samples. The literacy variable proxies for human capital and will have an impact on transitional growth and the long-run level of GDP per capita.
15 Bertoli (2006) has pointed out that it is desirable to have a feedback from human capital to remittances. This feedback is present in our model as literacy enters the growth equation, and growth is a variable in 12 Public expenditure on education as a share of GDP either has the wrong sign or is not significant in combination with making the intercept insignificant. In regard of the significance in the literacy equation this suggests that public expenditures are not so important for starting schooling but are important in succeeding to get basic education, here literacy. 13 An early contribution to the relation between literacy and growth is Azariadis and Drazen (1990) . 14 The aspect cited here does not appear in the version published later. 15 Illiteracy also captures inequality, because the illiterate are likely to be poor. In related work we found that Gini-cefficients of education get insignificant in growth regressions when literacy is included. Castelló and Doménech (2002) found that Gini coefficients of income change sign in growth regressions when Gini coefficients of education are included. By implication of the two findings literacy is likely to capture much of inequality.
the remittance equation for the first three samples. Moreover, the growth rate of employment plus depreciation 16 , approximated here by that of the labour force, 17 has a negative impact on the transitional growth rate and the steady-state level of GDP per capita. Finally, we will add some lagged dependent variables as an autocorrelation correction hoping that this absorbs the business cycle effects and allows interpreting the other regressors as growth effects. In models with imported inputs (see Bardhan/Lewis 1970) one finds also the growth rate of exports at constant terms of trade. This should be an income term in an export demand function and therefore is approximated here by the growth rate of the world GDP. When using this variable the initial value of the GDP per capita becomes insignificant and current literacy becomes significant in addition to the lagged one in some samples. Moreover, the model containing the GDP of the world has a higher adjusted R-squared than the one containing lagged dependent variables. Constant long-run growth in the world economy or by the OECD allows for positive permanent growth in this model. Equation (7) will be used to calculate the impact of remittances on the longrun growth rate of the model. We call this the permanent growth model.
Data and econometric method
All data are taken from the WDI (World Development Indicators). We include 99 countries selected by the criterion of having at least one dollar of remittances received in 2003 according to the data reported. Other criteria yield a lower number of observations. From the complete sample of 99 countries we drop three not having GDP data and call the sample remit96. We generate a second sample by eliminating those twelve countries that did not receive development aid. This eliminates OECD countries. We call this sample remaid84. Next, we divide this sample into those above and under (constant 2000) $ 1200 GDP per capita. The reason is that we found in earlier work that the 70 countries below $ 1200 have no growth in a panel average when looking at the period 1960 to 2003. However, both samples have 42 countries only, because many of the poor countries do not provide the relevant data. Estimating the model for four different samples will tell us how robust our model is in regard to dis-aggregation or how differently poor and rich countries with and without OECD countries react to remittances in regard to the level or the rate of growth. 18 Countries not reporting data may behave differently in particular because they are probably among the poorest. As we have to exclude them, our results may have a selection bias and differ from those of our samples as much as our samples have different results among each other. The data on remittances are official receipts in constant 2000 US$. Unofficial receipts may be high - Freund and Spatafora (2005) estimate that informal remittances are between 35 and 75 % of the official ones -and important but we have no way to deal with the issue directly 19 (see Adams/Page 2005) . 20 Data of the GDP per capita, gdppc and OEC are in constant 2000 US$ and stem from national accounts. 21 Interest rates, ri and rius, are real rates as obtained by use of the GDP deflator and taken from the IMF IFS Yearbook into the WDI data. Savings, savgdp, are gross national savings from national accounts, calculated as GDP minus consumption, plus net current transfers and factor income from abroad and expressed as a share of GDP. As investment, nvgdp, relates to the demand of net debt flows we use gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic investment) as a percent of GDP. The major difference with gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP, gfcfgdp, is the inventories, which are not investments that add to the capital stock as usually written into a production function. All savings and investment data come from the national accounts. Literacy data, lit, from the UNESCO are available in the WDI for 75 of our 99 countries for more than 30 years. Data on public expenditure on education are from the UNESCO. Data on official development aid, containing at least a grant element of 25 % on the interest rate benchmark of 10 %, stem from the OECD. Finally, enrolment into primary schooling, sepri, refers to data from UNESCO on the gross enrolment of a vintage, that is, older people who go to primary school make it possible for this number to get above 100 %.
The average values of some of these data are presented in Table 1 . These data show that all samples have positive growth rates of GDP per capita, but the poorest one has the lowest growth rate. Investment/GDP ratios are higher in richer samples and have higher growth rates in poorer samples. Savings/GDP ratios are highest in the middle-income groups and also have higher growth rates for poorer countries. Investment/GDP ratios are higher for all countries than savings/GDP ratios inducing higher indebtedness. Investment/GDP ratios have higher growth rates than savings/GDP ratios, implying that the indebtedness will also grow more quickly than in the past. Average remittances per unit of GDP are 2-3 % but with a growth rate of 2-5 %, which is larger for poorer samples. We estimate equations (1)- (7) as a system for pooled data. In the estimation of the system for pooled data we assume contemporaneous correlation, which means that the residuals of the equations may be correlated with each other for a given point in time. The reason for this may be that the variables do not only have growth effects but follow also a busi- 19 Panel data on remittance fees, which cause unofficial receipts, would be an interesting addition here.
But we are not aware of their availability. 20 We would like to point out though that GDP data also underestimate economic activity because of the neglect of the informal sector. Schneider and Enste (2000, Table 2 ) report values of 25-76 % of GDP for developing countries. This is the same order of magnitude as for remittances. For developed countries these values are lower. Informal remittances are falling as a share of the official ones. It is not clear though that the share of the informal sector is falling in developing countries over time.
The imperfection of remittances data is broadly discussed in all related papers. That of GDP data is not discussed anymore although it may be as severe. 21 We do not use purchasing power parity data because they are available only since 1975 in WDI 2007 and since 1980 in WDI 2008, whereas our data start in 1960.
ness cycle. Therefore the residuals are likely to move together. Moreover, we assume absence of serial correlation and weak exogeneity, which means that the residuals of an equation may be correlated with future regressors, but not with current or earlier ones. The interaction of these assumptions makes it possible that for example the remittances variable in equation (2) is correlated with the residuals of equations (1) and (2). Therefore lagged regressors should be used as instruments for the remittance variables in these equations. Moreover, we cannot exclude the possibility that the residuals follow moving averages. This would make the first lags of all left-hand variables, when they appear on the right-hand side, also endogenous. With or without moving average residuals, the higher lags than those on the right-hand side variables will be admissible instruments. The combination of endogeneity with contemporaneous correlation of the residuals leads to three-stage-least squares (3SLS), which in turn is a special case of the GMM-HAC estimator (see Greene 2008: 469) (General Method of Moments (GMM) in connection with the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation correction (HAC) for the covariance matrix).
22 Greene 2008) . However, except for equations (7) we have already added all significant lagged dependent variables. There is nothing in addition we can do, but conceding that there may be an additional, hopefully small, serial correlation bias, which then is likely to exist also in the literature from which we have taken the specification of the equations. Introducing serial correlation processes by assumption leads us to a 'near singular matrix' warning, not when doing it only for one equation alone but when doing it for several. Therefore, and because the instruments approach would not avoid endogeneity, we abandon this possibility, hoping that a potential serial correlation bias, if any, is small in view of the fact that the cross section dimension is much larger here than that of time. Durbin-Watson statistics may serve as a crude indicator of serial correlation. They are not reported in the appendices, but they are close to two for all equations except those for literacy and primary school enrolment. Division of the number of observations by the number of countries both presented in the appendices suggests that the number of periods is between two and fifteen, which is very short even for testing of serial correlation. For literacy and primary school enrolment the time dimension is only two or three, indicating that little can be done against autocorrelation if it is a problem at all with such a low time dimension. Note though that the GMM-HAC method presents standard errors that are corrected for serial correlation.
An alternative might be to estimate the equations single wise after checking for fixed effects redundancy. In case of redundancy, two-stage least squares methods could be used perhaps in combination with random effects methods. If fixed effects are not redundant we would have to employ dynamic panel data methods as explained in Baltagi (2005: Chapter 8) . We prefer to take the interaction of the residuals of different equations on board, because they contain the business cycle effects and therefore will be correlated, and therefore we use only the systems approach sacrificing the fixed effects, which would add 95 coefficients to each equation. We will leave the fixed effects approach for future research. Some variables are between zero and unity. These are literacy, gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP, and remittances as a share of GDP. 23 For these one might think of using log(y/(1-y)) instead of y as the dependent variable. We will postpone this approach to future research. We would like to point out though that our variables are on the country level, are not discrete (let alone binary), have many different values and are neither censored nor truncated. Moreover, the product of the regressors and their coefficients of the corresponding regressions are always smaller than those of the lagged dependent variables and ensure that there are no negative values for the dependent variables. A referee has pointed out that the heteroscedasticity is known in these cases (at least at the zero and unity values) and one should be cautious about putting too much weight on test statistics. In general, running simulations with estimated results often turns out to be an intuitively powerful plausibility test especially in case where the significance of a regressor is more plausible in the cross-section dimension then in the time dimension. It therefore helps excluding highly implausible alternatives in the model selection procedure.
Estimation results
The results for the systems estimate are summarized for the four samples in Appendix 1a-d. For the 96 countries receiving remittances the estimate in Appendix 1a is done without the inclusion of an aid variable, because they are available only for 84 countries and the results for that sample are shown in Appendix 1b. All coefficients have the expected sign. The significance is worse than 10 % only for four coefficients: the effect of domestic interest rates on receiving remittances in equation (1 0 ); the effect of primary school enrolments on the change of literacy in equation (5 0 ); and the constant of the growth equation (7 0 ). Only the last of these exceeds the 20 % significance level slightly. 24 In the first equation, the positive sign of the OECD per capita income and the negative one of the domestic GDP per capita are in accordance with the altruistic and strategic motives of migration and with those motives, which do not generate a clear expectation of the sign (see Rapoport/Docquier 2006) . The US interest rate and the OECD income have a stronger impact than the domestic counterparts. This will also be the case in all estimates for other samples given below. It confirms the result by Vargas-Silva and Huang (2006) for a 23 Savings ratios are in the interval (À 20, 70.5), school enrolment primary are in the interval (67, 139) as these are gross rates including older vintages going to school, and real interest rates are in (À 97.8, 79) . 24 We do not drop variables with weak significance levels if this would decrease the adjusted R-squared strongly or yield a weak Durbin-Watson statistic indicating serial correlation bias.
smaller sample that home country variables have a weaker impact on remittances than host country variables. The main channel to physical capital has the expected, significant coefficients: remittances have a positive effect on savings, c 23 ; savings have the expected negative effect on interest rates, c 34 , and also the quadratic term is significant; interest rates have a negative impact on gross fixed capital formation, c 43 ; gross fixed capital formation has a positive impact on growth rates, which is larger than the negative effect of the lagged value. For the human capital channel, savings enhance literacy, c 54 , and literacy enhances growth rates as the positive current effect is larger than the negative lagged effect. How strong these effects are will be calculated in the next section.
For the 84 countries receiving remittances and aid in 2003 the results can be found in Appendix 1b. These are very similar to those of the larger sample. The insignificant variables now are US interest rates in equation (1 00 ), again the enrolment variable in the literacy equation, the constant in the growth equation, and, though very close to the 10 % level, the OECD growth rate in the interest equation. By implication the channels to physical and human capital have only significant variables although with slightly different values. The model gives reasonable results after the elimination of the OECD countries from the larger sample. The development aid variable appears only in the form of first differences. Under the steady-state assumption that aid as a share of GDP should be constant this result implies that aid has neither a level effect nor a growth rate effect in the long run. In spite of the similarity with the 'medicine model' of development aid defined by the squared term (see Doucouliagos/ Paldam 2005) we would like to caution that we do not include all the variables, especially for economic policy, which have featured prominently in the aid effectiveness debate. Our motivation to include aid does not stem from a desire to contribute to the aid effectiveness debate but rather from the desire not to underestimate the equations of our model. In the transition though aid has a positive effect on savings, investment and primary school enrolment as long as it is increasing and below 25 % (for investment even 50 %). When aid is a constant share of GDP though, there is no effect anymore.
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For the 42 countries with GDP per capita above $ 1200 and receiving remittances and aid in 2003 we get quite a few insignificant results in Appendix 1c. This may be partly due to the fact that now the number of observations is about half of what it was in the previous sample and less than half of the first one. Mostly, then the coefficients are also smaller. With some exceptions results do not improve (in terms of adjusted R-squared) if we take out these insignificant variables. As overestimation does not produce biases whereas underestimation does (see Davidson/McKinnon 2004) it is less risky to keep them on board. We have eliminated though the quadratic terms of the aid variable from the equations for savings and primary school enrolment. Also, the quadratic term of the investment-savings difference has been dropped in the interest equation, where the second lag is replaced by the change of the US interest rate. In the investment equation, the aid variable now has a higher peak at about .8 before it is getting negative. In the growth equation almost all variables have smaller coefficients in absolute terms now. The current interest rate rather than the lagged one is significant now in the savings equation, and for literacy in the growth equation we lag by one year more than in the other regressions. In regard to the main channels, the impact of savings on interest rates is significant only at the 20 % level. For the growth equation the significance is even worse, both because the coefficients have become smaller and the standard errors are larger than in the larger samples. In the first equation for remittances the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable has gone down from .89 in the previous sample to .83 in this one. By implication we should expect that it goes up for the other half of the larger sample. For the 42 countries with GDP per capita below $ 1200 and receiving remittances and aid in 2003 the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable for remittances is -in line with the expectation three lines above -slightly larger than unity and differs insignificantly from unity. Therefore we have taken the first difference as the dependent variable. 26 There are five coefficients with marginal significance levels (p-values) between 10 and 20 percent and one worse than 20 %, which is the enrolment variable in the literacy equation. It has a very low coefficient too. Compared to the sample of countries with income above $ 1200, the quadratic term for aid in the savings equation is again significant and so is the quadratic investment-savings difference in the interest equation as they were in the sample of 84 countries receiving aid. The linear term for the aid variable in the investment equation has been taken out. Most importantly now the lagged savings variable does not appear in the literacy equation but rather the current one appears in the school enrolment equation. This suggests that in the richer countries one needs savings from earlier times to bring children through primary schooling, but in the poorest countries the bottleneck are current savings to start primary schooling. Comparing the results across the four samples also yields some interesting insights. We see larger coefficients of changes in remittances on savings in samples of poorer countries: a coefficient of .68 for the richest sample of 96 countries; 27 .69 for the second richest sample of countries with income above $ 1200; .88 for the 84 aid receiving countries; 1.85 and 1.91 respectively for the poorest sample. This may reflect the lower financial development of poorer countries as indicated theoretically by Cinar and Docquier (2004) and Bertoli (2006) and empirically by Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2008) . With less credit access people save more out of remittances. A low financial development may in principle also lead to a more intensive use of informal channels and less measured remittances and therefore to a higher coefficient. However, Niimi and Ö zden (2006) find no impact of financial development indicators on measured remittances though. Among the non-OECD countries, labour force growth has a more negative and world income growth a more positive sign in the growth equation the poorer the countries are. We would have expected that the public expenditure on education in the literacy equation has a weaker effect the richer the countries are as found by Otani and Villanueva (1990) . This holds except for the poorest sample, which has the lowest coefficient -perhaps because dropout rates are higher. 26 The result can be improved by adding quadratic terms but then the forecast follows these terms and makes very unrealistic predictions for the steady-state analyzed below. 27 Savings and investment rates are percentages multiplied by 100 in the WDI. Our own calculations of wr/GDP are not multiplied by 100. If they were, the coefficient would be lower by a factor 100. This explains the difference between the values in the Appendix such as 68 and the ones used here, 0.68.
The direct effect of a change in the rise of remittances on other endogenous variables
In order to understand the basic idea of the model it may be good to look first at the direct effects of changes in remittances on the endogenous variables, in particular the growth rate. For that purpose we abbreviate the variables as follows. w is worker remittances as a share of GDP. s is the savings ratio. f is gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP. 1 + r is the gross interest rate. li is the literacy rate. p is the rate of primary school enrolment. g is the growth rate of GDP per capita. x is a multiplication sign. The results for this part are collected in Table 2 . We illustrate the derivation of the results in terms of the model equations (2) - (7) assuming in this section only that there are exogenous changes in remittances for these equations. We do this numerically for the estimates regarding the largest sample of 96 countries receiving remittances in 2003.
In standard macroeconomic models one would speak of the impact effect. However, we have lags here and therefore call it direct effect. From equation (2), a one percent difference of dw, dðdwÞ ¼ 1, the change in the remittance/GDP ratio, yields:
This means that an increase of dw by one percentage point increases savings by almost .7 percentage points. Note that the panel average of ddw ¼ :0138, and not unity as in our example. Therefore all effects could be multiplied by this number to get the realistic values according to the panel average. The effect of this change in the savings ratio on the interest rate according to equation (3) is:
With an evaluation at a panel average of f-s = 4.06 and d(f-s) = -ds =-.682 from above 28 , the direct effect of remittances on interest rates using the numbers of Appendix 1a is: The gross interest rate changes by about (À .1 %). This change of the interest rate causes a percentage change of gross fixed capital formation according to equation (4) As we are dealing with the direct effect only, this change in f has not been taken into account in the previous step, when trying to find the effect on interest rates. The effect of the change in savings on that in literacy according to equation (5) is
Literacy changes by one and a half percent five years after the enhancement of savings.
According to the growth equation we get the direct effect as (note that values from five years before are given)
This is a very small percentage change of the GDP per capita. Interestingly though, the effect via human capital or literacy is twenty times as large as that via physical capital. Effects calculated so far are rewritten in the first column of Table 2 . For the other samples they can be found in the second through fourth column of Table 2 . For poorer samples the ratio goes from 20 to 2.5 for the poorest sample.
When dropping the OECD countries, the sample remaid84 has larger effects in absolute terms than the complete sample. Also the second difference of the remittance/GDP ratio, w, is larger. The relative strength of physical and human capital is now less strong; human capital has a growth effect that is more than four times as large as that of physical capital.
When splitting the sample we find for the poor countries that the effect of remittances on savings is much larger; the fall in interest rates is larger than in the samples considered previously; the effect on investment is about the same as for the 84 aid receivers; the effect on literacy is much smaller because the elasticity of primary school enrolment on literacy is very weak. Human capital has an effect on growth that is 2.5 times stronger than that of physical capital. The second difference of the remittance/GDP ratio is twice as large as for the remaid84 sample.
For countries above $ 1200, things are quite different. The impact of remittances on savings is about the same as for the largest sample. The fall in interest rates is much lower than in all other samples. Correspondingly the effect on investment is weaker. The effect on literacy is a bit larger though. The total effect on growth is about the same as for the 96 countries. Note however, that these are effects for ddw ¼ 1, the second difference of the remittance/GDP ratio is taken to be unity. The major difference between the sample with countries above $ 1200 and the others is that the panel average of ddw is negative for this sample. The actual yearly effects therefore have the opposite signs and are much smaller in absolute terms. This is the reason why it is useful to split the analysis into the effects for ddw ¼ 1 and the actual size of the change in the rise of remittances.
Overall, we can say that poorer countries do not only have a stronger impact of remittances on savings as pointed out above, but also a stronger direct effect on growth.
The direct effects considered here do little more than illustrating the basic ideas that drove the set up of the model. The indirect effects, as indicated above for the gross fixed capital formation on interest rates come from the calculated changes on all endogenous variables again. Multiplier effects then also take into account that all changing variables have an impact on their own future values and of course all the three sorts of effects then interact. What one would like to know than is the total long run effect on the level and the growth rate of the GDP per capita.
6 The long-run solution of the permanent growth model with and without remittances
In this section we first solve the model for its steady-state values and than do it again under the assumption of no change of remittances. A steady state is defined as follows: A constant growth rate of the GDP per capita for the receiving countries and constant interest rates, a constant but positive growth rate for the GDP of the OECD and the labour force variable. First, we have to find a steady-state growth rate of the world economy used in equations (7 i-iv ). We run an instrumental variable regression of that rate on its own lagged value using second lags as instruments. The result is a steady-state growth rate of about 3.4 %. Next, we assume a certain value of the growth rate of the domestic economy and go through a procedure explained below. If that one does not come out in the end, we adjust it, and go through the whole procedure again until the assumed growth rate equals the one coming out. This process stops when the rounding by the program used does not allow further refinements. The procedure referred to above is as follows. Equation (1) then implies a constant change of the remittance/GDP ratio, i.e. a constant dðwr=GDPÞ. Constant aid and savings follow from equation (2), and constant investment and gross fixed capital formation from equations (3) and (4), all as a share of GDP; constant public expenditure on education as a share of GDP, enrolment in primary schooling and a constant literacy rate follow from equations (5) and (6). As an implication of this definition, our variables and there lagged values must then be identical, except for logOEC, which has a positive but constant time trend and therefore a constant growth rate.
As the model has quadratic terms of the investment-savings difference, the enrolment in primary schooling and the literacy rate, we cannot solve it in 'one shot' after implementing the above assumptions but rather must proceed in certain steps.
The first step is to take first differences of equation (1) and employ the steady-state assumptions. The result is a value for dðwr=gdpÞ depending on the growth rate of the OECD. For the OECD we assume a steady-state growth rate of 2 %. This is obtained from running an autoregressive instrumental variable regression of log(OEC) on a time trend and three lags and calculating the steady-state value of the growth rate. The results for the steady-state change of the remittance/GDP ratio are summarized in Table 3 for the first three samples. For the poorer sample, equation (1 iv ) in the Appendix shows that we cannot solve independently for the change of the remittance/GDP ratio. It can be shown that for past OECD growth rates of about 2.5 % the time trend in log(oec) and the time trend in the regression cancel out. Using the abbreviations from the end of section 4 this leaves us with dðwÞ ¼ c 11 þ c 13 * logðOECð0ÞÞ þ c 15 * logð1 þ rÞþ c 16 *ðlogð1 þ rÞ À logð1 þ riusðÀ2ÞÞÞ A regression of logðOECÞ on a polynomial of time yields an initial value for logðOECÞ of 9.12. An autoregressive instrumental variable model of order one for the US interest rate yields a steady state value of about 4.3 %. Using these values and the estimated coefficients from equation (1 iv ) we get the results noted in Table 3 , where the right-hand side remains a function of the domestic interest rate. However, the term with the interest rate is 2:05 Â 10 À4 Â logð1 þ rÞ. As logð1 þ rÞ is also a number like 8 % this expression is of the order of magnitude of 16 Â 10 À6 and therefore can be dropped, leaving us with the number presented in Table 3 . The yearly change in the remittance/GDP ratio lies between one tenth and nine tenths of a percent. For non-OECD countries, it is larger the poorer the sample is. The next step uses equations (2)- (4), imposes the steady-state assumptions and results, inserts the estimated coefficients and solves for f, s, and r, the investment/GDP ratio, the savings/GDP ratio and the domestic interest rate. In doing so we equalize the investment/ GDP ratio with gross fixed capital formation per unit of GDP plus a constant of about 1.4 % (different for each sample) from regressing them on each other, which represents the percentage share of inventories, as both follow a one-to-one correlation. The procedure in greater detail is to solve (4) for f, (2) for s and form f-s; together with (3) this gives two functions in f-s and r. Solving, r can be inserted into (2) to get s and then f follows. For three of the samples we get two solutions, of which one makes no sense because interest rates and savings rates are highly negative and investment rates exorbitantly positive. Therefore these are ignored. The detailed procedure described above, results in the solutions of Table 3 . All samples but the poorest have higher steady-state investment than savings in the steady state, which indicates that debt accumulation continues also in the steady state. The poorest sample may be credit rationed and has savings about as high as investment, but at a low interest rate, as savings are slightly higher.
Next, we can go to the equation for enrolments. This can be solved independently except for the last sample where we will use the savings rate just derived. As this is an inverted u-shape function, the partially stable equilibrium is the one with higher enrolments. The panel average value is larger than the threshold value. Therefore we use this high value as the steady-state value.
Now we can solve for the literacy rate provided we have a long-run value for public expenditure on education. We run an autoregressive least-squares-dummy-variable 29 regression on the lagged value and its quadratic value, resulting in a steady-state value between 3 and 5 % as documented in the first line of Table 3 . This equation also has an inverted u-shape form. The lower steady-state value though has negative numbers in all cases. The higher steady-state values for literacy are amazingly close to 100 % and almost so for enrolments.
Finally, using all results obtained so far we can calculate the steady-state growth rate of the GDP per capita from the last regression of the model, equations (7 i-iv ), provided we have a steady-state value for the growth of the labour force. We run a least-squares-dummy-variable regression of the labour force growth rate on its lags, with linear and quadratic terms and calculate the steady-state values, which are around 2 %, with higher values for poorer countries.
In panel (b) of Table 3 we present the numbers that are obtained when setting the changes in the remittances equal to zero when running through the whole calculation again. In panel (c) we take differences of panel (a) and (b) for all variables that are already percentage expressions. Steady-state growth rates are positive though small, .23 %, .22 %, and .36 % for the first three samples. 30 For the poorest sample we find a result of a 'po-sitive-zero' growth rate, or more exactly less than 2.8 percent of a percent, 2:75 Â 10 À4 . The counterfactual exercise of dropping remittances shows that the ratio of the growth rates obtained with and without remittances is less than 1.004 for the first three samples but 1.39 for the sample of the poorest countries below $ 1200 per capita income according to panel (c) of Table 3 . Literacy goes to hundred percent anyway and remittances make a difference of less than a half percent. However, primary school enrolments are enhanced by remittances and speed up the move to the steady state, leading to transitional gains from remittances via savings to enrolments and quicker movement of literacy to hundred percent. For the poorest sample this effect is larger again than for the others.
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Remittances have a very strong impact on savings of the sample with countries under $ 1200 and, less so, on the sample above $ 1200. This leads also to a fall in interest rates. Similarly, gross fixed capital formation per unit of GDP increases by one percentage point in the poorest countries but much less so in the other samples, because they react only weakly to the decrease in interest rates that is caused by the increase in savings. In sum, the transitional gains from higher enrolment rates going from 95 to 100 %, the permanent gains from paying less interest to debtors because of a savings rate that goes from 12 to 20 % and the increase in the growth rate of the GDP per capita for the poorer sample may represent a considerable welfare gain. For countries above $ 1200 though these gains are fairly small. In sum, the major effects for the poorest sample are that remittances bring the steadystate primary schooling enrolment rates from 95 to 100 %, the savings rate from 12 % to 21 %, and the growth rate from 1:9 Â 10 À4 to 2:75 Â 10 À4 for the sample of countries with per capita income below (constant 2000) $ 1200 and reduce the foreign debt service. The ratio of these growth rates is 1.39, which means that the growth rate is 39 % percent higher than without remittances. For the richer sample these effects are much smaller. Transitional gains may be higher.
Stability and transitional gains
Steady-state results as presented in the previous section are only interesting if the steady states are stable. Therefore we should present a stability analysis. 32 Moreover, besides the steady state, the transition is also interesting. In order to obtain a stability analysis and the transitional path, we iterate the estimated model of Appendix 1 forward in a deter- 31 This may seem to be partly be due to the fact that richer countries have higher literacy already.
However, also the richer sample has an average of below 82 % of literacy (see Table 1 ) and only 7 % of all observations in this sample are in the top 2.5 % bracket of literacy rates. For the poorer sample this rate is a very similar 2 %. An alternative human capital variable could be secondary school enrolment because it has a similar strong variation. Literacy varies from 7-100 % and secondary schooling from 1.4 % to 127 % in the sample of 84 countries. However, including secondary school enrolment may require an extension of the model by several variables explaining it. Then one could argue that poorer countries have stronger effects of remittances on human capital because they have much more of a lower basis to start from then for literacy. Gross enrolment rates much higher than 100 % would leave traces in the estimates with unclear consequences for the long run. The major difference between the samples in our view is the impact of remittances on the savings ratios. 32 Thereby we automatically include second and higher round effects, which are missing in many other types of studies (see Adams 2006) . ministic way and repeat this after setting the remittance term in the savings equation equal to zero, in order to get the counterfactual of 'what would have happened hypothetically without changes in remittances'. This allows us to see the transitional path and whether or not it goes to the steady-state values. We do this for two samples of countries above $ 1200 and below $ 1200. To be able to do this, we have to construct initial values, because the data deliver them only per country whereas our model has estimated paraSource: Author's simulations Figure 1 Stability of the permanent growth model meters, which are averages across countries and over time. We construct the initial values by running fixed effect regressions of the variables on a constant and a polynomial of time. All other assumptions carry over from the previous analysis. We only have to add a data series on development aid per unit of GDP, which was not necessary for the steadystate analysis. In order to get that we run a regression of aid/GDP ratio on its own two or three lagged values. As in the steady-state calculations, we assume that the time trend in logðoecÞ and the time trend in the regression (1) cancel out because a slight difference could cause instability. The results for stability are summarized in Figure 1 . In Figure 2 we plot the differences of the variables with and without remittances for the permanent growth model in order to make the undiscounted gains during the transition visible. Stability The strongest fluctuations can be seen in the series for real interest rates. After the phase of fluctuations they get smooth for the richer sample sample but turn into a zigzag pattern for the poorer sample. One can take it from the regression results of Appendix 1 that interest series are based on yearly data. The regressions based on five-year lags -enrolment, literacy and GDP per capita (growth) -have been turned in to yearly data by making five initial values. All zigzag patterns in figure 1 are getting smoother over time around 2010 as they should for unique, stable steady states. The strongly upward sloping line for the richer countries is the remittance/GDP ratio. In 2100 it has a value of about 9.3 %. If iterating forward to 2700 it would still be at reasonable values of about 88 % and 79 % respectively. Ultimately, these graphs show stability, which can be shown more exactly when we would show the forward iterations for some hundred years more.
Transitional gains
We consider the richer sample first. Figure 2a shows the difference for the endogenous variables for the iteration with and without the remittance term. For the savings/GDP ratio there is first a surprising fall. Once this period is over, the difference in the savings/ ratio goes to a value that is .9 %, which means that the ratio is higher with remittances than without, and then approaches its steady-state difference of .8 %. In the transition, interest rates are more frequently higher than lower and then approach a very low difference of À .002. The more frequently positive differences are reflected in the difference for the gross fixed capital formation per unit of GDP. This first goes down before it goes up and approaches a positive long-run difference after a slight overshooting. However, this is not more than .04 percent in the long run and the transitional phase with higher values does not really more than the worse phases. The undiscounted transitional gains seem to be smaller than the undiscounted steady-state gains in regard to physical capital formation. In regard to literacy we see that it is higher in the long run, but also much less so in the transitional phase. For the poorer sample we do not get a counterintuitive phase first, but rather savings rates are higher right from the beginning. Interest rates are lower with remittances and gross fixed capital formation, as a percent of GDP are higher, as expected. Primary school enrolments are much higher with remittances. It is here for the first time that we see that transitional gains may be higher than the long-run gains if the discounting of the future is strong enough. Similarly, the differences in the literacy rate are stronger in the transition than in the long run. 
Summary and conclusion
The innovations of this paper are as follows. The main idea is that remittances enhance savings; savings do two things. First, they reduce interest rates, which encourage investment. Second, savings enhance either school enrolment or keep the school participation in tact by ensuring finance, thus enhancing literacy. Investment and literacy then enhance the level and the growth rate of the GDP per capita. These are the main channels in the model. We built a model of six equations from recent modern literature and add a seventh one for enrolment in primary schooling. Then we enhance the savings equation to include remittances. We extend the equation relating the current account and the interest rate by a quadratic term, the OECD GDP per capita growth rate and, for one of the samples, changes in US interest rates. The growth equation is enhanced to include lagged in addition to current investment and includes literacy as a human capital variable. All equations are estimated jointly as a system with pooled data using the General Method of Moments with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation corrected standard errors, allowing for contemporaneous correlation of the residuals of the seven equations, for four different samples. The estimates show that the model works well for all the samples with only minor modifications mostly related to the functioning of capital markets. The number of insignificant variables is very low for each sample, especially along the main channel of the argument from remittances via savings to investment and literacy, with a slightly weaker performance for the countries with per capita income above $ 1200. Estimation results are as follows. Remittances have higher growth rates in poorer countries. Their change has a positive impact on savings, which is stronger in poorer countries. Among the non-OECD countries, labour force growth has a more negative and world income growth a more positive sign the poorer the countries are. The direct effect along the main channel of the argument is very small. The largest are observed for countries below per capita income of $ 1200.
With 39 % of the growth rate of the GDP per capita remittances make a strong contribution to the growth of the countries below $ 1200. However, this should not lead to any sort of development optimism because the steady-state growth rate is 2:75 Â 10 À4 with remittances instead of 1:9 Â 10 À4 without remittances. It remains very small.
Stability is shown through forward iteration of the model. The undiscounted transitional gains are lower than the undiscounted steady-state gains for all variables except for primary school enrolment and literacy of the countries below per capita income of $ 1200. Long-run and transitional effects of savings investment and literacy are stronger in the poorer sample. For the GDP per capita the log difference in the poorer sample with and without remittance changes is 2 % of the GDP per capita. As savings react much stronger to remittances than investment does, less debt is accumulated and less debt service is paid. This paper has not suggested anything for policy. In particular remittances are only one aspect of the brain drain or gain debate. 33 However, given the moderate performance of official development aid one gets the impression that remittances are more effective in enhancing growth. As a suggestion for future research we therefore like to raise the questions (i) whether or not remittances should be taxed less on both sides, the sender coun-tries (Ranis 2007 ) and the receiving countries (Chami et al. 2008) , and (ii) whether or not this should be financed through a reduction of official development aid or through other means like reduction of inefficient subsidies or increases of efficient taxes. Chami et al. (2006) suggest that remittances should induce higher labour income taxes and inflation taxes in a model with an exogenous capital stock and no education. They argue that countercyclical remittances weaken the volatility smoothing forces for example by encouraging more leisure in a downturn. As a suggestion for further research we would like to ask whether this also holds under an endogenous capital stock. Then remittances perhaps have a positive impact on investment (and education) and might strengthen volatility smoothing forces.
